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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Legal status as an Indian is not determined solely upon the basis of race. It is also based
upon a person's recognition as an Indian by the Indian community with which he associates. Due
to legal circumstances peculiar to the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation, Defendant/Appellant
Perank did not enjoy legal status as an Indian prior to October 8,1986 (the date of his enrollment).
His status as a non-Indian at the time of commission of all criminal acts complained of, including
parole violations, brings him within the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Utah. He was appropriately prosecuted under the laws of the State of Utah. The appeal should be dismissed upon the
ground that Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, was not an Indian at the time he came under the
criminal jurisdiction of the State of Utah.
ARGUMENT

Pursuant to leave of the Court granted November 10, 1987, the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation (hereafter called "the Tribe") hereby files this brief amicus curiae.
Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, claims that he is not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Utah because he is an Indian. Appellant's brief states that, although he was not
an enrolled member, he was eligible for enrollment under the tribal constitution and was, therefore,
an Indian. Amicus curiae, Ute Indian Tribe, believes that there are serious omissions in the briefs
of Appellant, Respondent, and amici curiae^ Duchesne and Uintah Counties regarding Appellant's
legal status as an Indian. It appears to the Ute Indian Tribe that the parties and other amici curiae
are not as interested in analyzing the threshold issue of Appellant's legal status as an Indian as they
are in convincing the Court to use this case to assist them to obtain review of a civil case1 by the
United States Supreme Court after that court denied certiorari.
Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, is the offspring of a full-blood Ute and a non-Ute
mother who has some Indian (not Ute) blood. Thus, Mr. Perank has a maximum of 4/8 Ute blood
and possibly less. As explained below, he was viewed as a mixed-blood by the Tribe and was not
considered an Indian in the legal sense until he was enrolled as a tribal member pursuant to a ruling
of the Tribal Appellate Court which allowed him a window of opportunity to enroll. If he had not
enrolled when he did, he would still be considered a non-Indian by the Tribe due to an
Amendment2 to the Ute Tribal Constitution which was adopted earlier this year and which closed
the window of opportunity for certain mixed-bloods, including Appellant, to enroll.
Due to events peculiar to the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, it has
become necessary for the Tribe to regard all persons as non-Indians in a legal sense unless and un1

Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 107 S.Ct 596 (Dec. 1,1986).
Amendment to the Ute Tribal Constitution adopted April 12, 1988, effective April 15,1988, requires a minimum
of 5/8 blood relationship to persons whose names appear on the roll of full-bloods published April 5, 1956.
Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, does not qualify for enrollment under this standard.
2

1

til they become enrolled members of the Tribe or of another federally recognized tribe. For example, the jurisdictional provisions of the Ute Law and Order Code3 carefully state that membership
(enrollment) in the Tribe or in another federally recognized tribe is a prerequisite to the Tribal
Courts assuming personal jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters. To the Ute Indian Tribe,
enrollment in a federally recognized Indian tribe is the sine qua non of a person's legal status as an
Indian.4 This view is more restrictive than guidelines which have evolved in the courts for the
determination of legal status as an Indian in other Indian communities5. It is a rational view which
has its roots in the circumstances surrounding the Ute Partition Act6 and in the need to draw a
clear distinction between those who are legally considered Indians and those whose special status
as Indians has been terminated by act of Congress.
Prior to 1954, the Tribe consisted of persons of full-blood Ute ancestry and also of mixedblood offspring of full-bloods who married non-Utes. Congress passed the Ute Partition Act in
1954. 25 U.S.C. § 677v terminated the mixed-blood's entitlement to federal services which were
available "because of their status as Indians," and federal jurisdiction over them which attached
"because of their status as Indians."7 Rolls were published April 5, 1956 setting forth the names
of persons who were considered by the Secretary of the Interior to be full-blood Utes and those
who were considered mixed-bloods subject to termination. Membership in the Ute Indian Tribe
and, consequently, a person's special legal status as an Indian is now determined by a person's
ancestral relationship to those 1,314 full-bloods whose names are listed on the published roll.
Approximately 490 mixed-bloods had their legal status as Indians terminated effective August 27,1961. Although they obviously remained anthropologically of Indian ancestry, they were
no longer subject to the special restraints which were characteristic of their former legal status as

3

§ 1-2-5 of the Ute Indian Law and Order Code: Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions, or limitations
contained in either federal law, or the Tribal Constitution, the Courts of the Ute Indian Tribe shall have jurisdiction
over all civil causes of action, and over all offenses prohibited by this Code except the Courts of the Ute Indian Tribe
shall not assume jurisdiction over any civil or criminal matter which does not involve either the Tribe, its officers,
agents, employees, property or enterprises, or a member of the Tribe, or a member of a federally recognized tribe, if
some other forum exists for the handling of the matter and if the matter is not one in which the rights of the Tribe
or its members may be directly or indirectly affected.
4
This definition has been very helpful in the Tribe's efforts to follow the holding that Tribal Courts do not have
inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians [Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191; 55 L. Ed. 2d
209; 98 S. Ct 1011 (1978)]. The federal government also has used this definition in determining who is subject to
the jurisdiction of its Courts of Indian Offenses. See 25 CFR 11.2(c): "For the purpose of the enforcement of the
regulations in this part, an Indian shall be deemed to be any person of Indian descent who is a member of any
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction..." [emphasis added]
5
See United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1974) for another example of the effect of a termination act on
jurisdiction. See Duro v. Reina 821 F.2d 1358; 1987 U.S. App.LEXIS 8883 at Lexis page [*13] for review of
standards used in other cases.
6
25 U.S.C §§677-677aa.
7
Donna Land Maldonado and Barbara Land Cuch, Plaintiffs, v. Donald P. Hodel, Ross O. Swimmer, Defendants,
Civil No. 86-C-1050G United States District Court For The District Of Utah, Central Division, 683 F. Supp.
1322; 1988 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3276 February 19, 1988 at Lexis page [*23]. See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)

2

power to enter into contracts. Neither did they enjoy the economic benefits thereof.8
Property was divided between, the terminated mixed-bloods and 'the Tribe. Federal supervision over property belonging to the n dxed-bloods was also terminated Since mixed-bloods
were no longer entitled to federal services nor entitled to participate in the economic benefits of
tribal membership, it became necessary to draw a clear distinction between those who were legally
considered Indians and those who were not. Enrollment as a member of the Tribe was the only
truly workable criterion upon which, federal and 'tribal benefits could, be based, In the heterogeneous population of .mixed-bloods and full-bloods living in the Uinta Basin, a. person, does not
achieve the legal status of being Indian until he or she is enrolled as a member of the Tribe ' Fhis
criterion "becomes increasingly important with the passage of time. Full-bloods may marry mixedbloods or members of other races. The eligibility of their children for special legal,,, status as Indians depends "upon the children's genealogical, relationship to the original, published roll of fullbloods and other factors. It is very desirable from, an administrative viewpoint to have a, prospective tribal member prove the requisite genealogical, status, birthplace and residence of parents at
rime of bi rth in an application for enrollment and thereafter simply refer to an enrollment number
when various benefits of Indian status are being sought "I his criterion, also allows persons who
are eligible for enrollment and who have not enrolled to avoid the legal, status of being an, Indian, if
they prefer the less restrictive lifestyle enjoyed by non-Indians. The price for such freedom,, is that
those persons do not enjoy the benefits of Indian status unless and until they enroll as members at
some later date.
Felix,, S. Cohen, in his Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1,940) states at page 2, column 2:
Recognizing the possible diversity of definitions of "Indianhood," we
may nevertheless find some practical value in a definition of "Indian" as a person
meeting two qualifications: (a) That some of his ancestors lived in America before its discovery by the white race, and (b) that the individual is considered an
"Indian" by the community in which he lives.
The function of a definition of "Indian" is to establish a test whereby it
may be determined whether a given individual is to be excluded from the scope of
legislation dealing with Indians

It is argued In Appellant's brief that Defendant/Appellant, Clinton, Perank, should be considered an
Indian because he was eligible for enrollment. Cohen,fs definition, above, turns not on a, person's
eligibility, but on, recognition, of "Indianhood" by the community in, u hich he lives, Cohen's is a
workable definition,, because it takes into consideration the differing circumstances among the
various Indian communities. At page 5 column 2 of his Handbook, Cohen explains one rationale
8

Donna Land Maldonado and Barbara Land Cuch, Plaintiffs, v, Donald,, P. Model, Ross O. Swimmer, Defendants,
Civil No. 86-C-1050G United States District Court For The District, Of Utah,,, Central Division,, 683 F Supp.
1322; 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3276 February 19, 1988 at Lexis page [*2]

3

behind using tribal membership as a criterion for "Indianhood." He refers to the CFR definition of
Indian (see footnote 4 herein): "...any person of Indian descent who is a member of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction."9 Cohen then states:
This definition exemplifies the idea that in dealing with Indians the
Federal Government is dealing primarily not with a particular race as such but
with members of certain social-political groups towards which the Federal Government has assumed special responsibilities.

The need to clearly differentiate between those persons for whom the federal government still has
special responsibilities and those whose special relationship has been terminated has led the Ute
Indian Tribe to emulate the federal practice of recognizing persons of Ute descent as Indian only
after they have been enrolled as members of the Tribe. For many years, the Tribe followed the
criterion of a minimum of 5/8 blood from those listed on the April 5,1956 fiill-blood roll. The 5/8
blood quantum requirement was set by an ordinance enacted by the Tribal Business Committee.
The Ute Tribal Appellate Court10 ruled that the 5/8 blood quantum requirement was inconsistent
with its interpretation of the criteria for eligibility contained in the tribal constitution and, therefore,
invalid. Pursuant to this ruling, the Tribe allowed Appellant and other mixed-bloods to enroll. An
amendment to the Constitution of the Ute Indian Tribe was adopted April 12,1988, effective April
15, 1988 which elevated the 5/8 blood quantum requirement to constitutional status. Thus, Appellant would not be eligible to enroll if he had not enrolled when he did.
Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, was enrolled as a member of the Ute Indian Tribe on
October 8,1986. All of the alleged criminal acts took place prior to that date. Prior to October 8,
1986, Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, was not an Indian in the eyes of the Indian community
in which he lives. He was, therefore, subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Utah and
was appropriately prosecuted under Utah law.
CONCLUSION

The appeal should be dismissed upon the ground that Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank,
was not an Indian at the time he came under the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted this nineteenth day of July, 1988.

9

This is the federal equivalent to the definition used by the Ute Indian Tribe in § 1-2-5 of its Ute Law and Order
Code (see footnote 3 above).
10
Haskell Levi Chapoose, et. al. v. Ute Tribe, et. al., Civil Numbers: 9-78,11-78, 133-77,144-77 (combined).
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